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CURING THE REAL PROBLEM: CLEANING UP FOURTH
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE BY ALTERING OUR




The Exclusionary Rule is a judicially created mechanism aimed at giving
the Fourth Amendment teeth. A violation of the Fourth Amendment thus is met
with the bite of the Exclusionary Rule. However, recent Supreme Court case
law has suggested that the teeth of the Fourth Amendment (the Exclusionary
Rule) may be too sharp.' The Fourth Amendment's "sharp" teeth may have
begun to be replaced with a new set of dull ones to ensure that its bite does not
cut society too deeply.
The highly controversial automatic exclusionary has been called into doubt
by many, and supported by others. But it is hard to dispute that many instances
where evidence is excluded for extremely technical or unforeseeable Fourth
Amendment violations seem perverse to our own sense of justice. When this
occurs, the public does not feel more protected, they feel more unsafe. When
this occurs, the public does not feel relieved, they feel uneasy. The rigid
application of the American exclusionary rule has had the opposite effect of its
intended design-less privacy protection for all of us.
2
This article has three purposes. First and foremost is to submit a proposal
into the academic realm advocating for the replacement of the automatic
exclusionary rule with a discretionary exclusionary rule, solely in the Fourth
* Lawrence Joseph Perrone, J.D., William & Mary School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. - (2009); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586
(2006).
2. Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111, 112 (2003).
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Amendment context. 3 The second purpose of this paper is to generate debate
amongst those who advocate for the automatic exclusionary rule and those who
call for its abrogation or replacement. Debates will hopefully center around the
origins of the exclusionary rule, whether it is constitutionally justified, and
whether it should be replaced with an alternative remedy. The final purpose of
this paper is to stimulate interest in the criminal procedure jurisprudence of other
nations. Too infrequently has our government ignored the practices and
precedents of other nations in shaping our policies. International practices and
precedents can provide valuable insights and guideposts in shaping future
criminal procedure policies, especially since many of these nations have used our
jurisprudence as learning tools in shaping their own.4
Presumably, this proposal will be resisted and challenged by those who
argue that the only way to ensure individual privacy is the automatic
exclusionary rule. On the other hand, some argue that the appropriate remedy is
not the exclusion of evidence, but rather, punishing police officers and/or
reducing prisoners' sentences. 5  In any event, those who support the
exclusionary rule in its current form may be reluctant to replace an automatic
rule with a discretionary one. But adopting a discretionary exclusionary rule is
not an attempt to prosecute and jail more criminals. Rather, it is aimed at
protecting more privacy. A discretionary exclusionary model is consistent with
the Constitution and protects more privacy by curing the real problem.
The real problem is the complex morass of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence 6 that has resulted from judges avoiding the harsh consequences of
the automatic exclusionary rule. 7 Avoidance of this harsh remedy has turned
otherwise unreasonable searches into constitutionally protected police action
because "courts keep expanding what is deemed a reasonable search or
seizure."'8 The presence of the automatic remedy has resulted in the Supreme
Court taking "a grudging view of what amounts to a 'search' or 'seizure' ... and
has taken a relaxed view of what constitutes consent to an otherwise illegal
search or seizure; it has so softened the 'probable cause' requirement ... and so
3. This article does not address the application of the automatic exclusionary rule in the Fifth
or Sixth Amendment context. Just as a note, I am in favor of an automatic exclusionary rule in
these contexts due to the reliability problems associated with these types of constitutional
violations. This article only addresses the reform of the automatic exclusionary rule in the Fourth
Amendment context.
4. Other nations have worked out the kinks in rules that may not operate as efficiently or
effectively as we may desire.
5. Calabresi, supra note 2, at 114-15.
6. Gregory D. Totten et al., The Exclusionary Rule: Fix It, But Fix It Right, 26 PEPP. L. REV.
887, 900-03 (1999).
7. Calabresi, supra note 2, at 112.
8. Id.
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narrowed the thrust of the exclusionary rule that nowadays the criminal only
'goes free' if and when the constable has blundered badly."9
Freed from the chains of an automatic remedy, judges will be more likely to
find constitutional violations. Over time, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
will become clearer-with privacy more enshrined.' 0 When judges are free to
find a constitutional violation without fear of the automatic exclusionary rule, it
is likely that many more violations will be found ultimately resulting in the
transformation of the complex, exception-ridden Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence into a set of clearly outlined rules. With clear rules our privacy
will be more ensured. Clear rules equal fewer violations, and thus, more
privacy. 12
Part I of this article will describe the history and current state of the
American Exclusionary Rule. Part II of this article, in contrast, will outline both
Australia and Canada's discretionary approaches to the exclusionary rule. Part
III will shift gears and set forth the current debate surrounding the highly
controversial American automatic exclusionary rule by articulating the many
divergent positions held by scholars and practitioners alike. Part IV will propose
the adoption of a discretionary exclusionary rule to replace our current automatic
exclusionary rule. This proposal provides a model statute or Restatement, as it
were, borrowing concepts and rationale from both Australia and Canada's
discretionary models. As will be demonstrated, a discretionary model will be
effective in our jurisprudence so long as the factors to be weighed are consistent
with our values (rather than factors other countries consider). While reforming
the exclusionary rule may be an uphill battle, adding another comparative
approach may help paint another picture against an already familiar landscape.
II. THE AMERICAN EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, facing a blatant violation of
the Fourth Amendment, adopted the exclusionary rule in federal courts. 13 The
rule required unconstitutionally obtained evidence to be excluded from the
proceedings against the accused. The Court gave two justifications for its newly
9. Yale Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 119, 133 (2003).
10. Replacing the automatic exclusionary rule will likely constrict the definition of
"reasonable" thus protecting more privacy.
11. See Totten et al., supra note 6, at 900-03.
12. See id.
13. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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crafted rule: (1) to deter unconstitutional police conduct and (2) to preserve and
ensure the integrity of the judicial system.
The federal exclusionary rule was not extended to the States until almost
five decades later in Mapp v. Ohio.15 In another egregious Fourth Amendment
violation, the police searched Mapp's home without a warrant 16 after being
denied entry earlier the same day. The Court held that unconstitutionally
procured evidence by state officials must be excluded because to hold otherwise
"tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the
liberties of the people rest." 
17
Individuals who support the exclusionary rule as articulated in Mapp
typically quote Mapp's very strong language:
[A]ll evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court. 18
[W]e can no longer permit it [the Fourth Amendment] to be revocable at the
whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself,
chooses to suspend its enjoyment. 19
Mapp is not only important for extending the exclusionary rule to the
States, but also for its emphatic command on courts to exclude
unconstitutionally obtained evidence. It is also important because it clarified the
rationale supporting the rule: "The initial justifications for the rule were to deter
improper police conduct, and to protect judicial integrity in terms of evidence
offered at trial. These dual reasons have given way to a single rationale for the
rule, deterrence of improper police activity."
20
It is clear that the touchstone of the modem exclusionary rule calls upon
courts to ask whether excluding the evidence will deter future police
14. Id. at 394 (stating, "[t]o sanction such proceedings [where unconstitutionally obtained
evidence is admitted] would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open
defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against
such unauthorized action").
15. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
16. Id. at 645 (production of a search warrant by the prosecution never occurred at trial and the
court was in "considerable doubt" whether there was ever a search warrant).
17. Id. at 660.
18. Id. at 655.
19. Id. at 660 (addition to original).
20. Paul Marcus & Vicki Waye, Australia and the United States: Two Common Criminal
Justice Systems Uncommonly at Odds, 12 TUL. J. COMP. & INT'L L. 27, 58 (2004) (citing United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984)).
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misconduct.2 1 In light of this inquiry, the Court has created limitations on the
application of the exclusionary rule where exclusion would not serve to deter
police misconduct. For example, the Court has refused to extend the
exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings 22 but has allowed illegally obtained
evidence to be admitted in federal civil proceedings because the deterrent effect
. .. .. 23
is aimed at criminal prosecutions of the accused. In one controversial decision,
the Court refused to exclude evidence where the police relied in good faith on a
defective warrant issued by a magistrate. 24 Excluding the evidence would not
deter police misconduct because the constitutional error was created by the
magistrate, not the police.
25
It seems that since Mapp the Supreme Court has incrementally chipped
away at the exclusionary rule. However, academics, practitioners, and judges
alike still classify the rule as mandatory or automatic. The fact that there are
exceptions does not make it any less mandatory. Just two years ago, the Court
took another slice out of the automatic exclusionary rule.
In Hudson v. Michigan, Justice Scalia writing for the majority stated that
the "[s]uppression of evidence, however, has always been our last resort, not our
first impulse." 26  The exclusionary rule will only be applied "where its
deterrence benefits outweigh its 'substantial social costs. ' '27 In Hudson, the
police were executing a validly executed search warrant. Arriving at Hudson's
door the police knocked, announced their presence and then forcibly entered the
residence only three to five seconds after their knock and announce. It was
stipulated that this was a violation of the Fourth Amendment's knock-and-
announce rule; thus, the only question was whether the Court should exclude the
evidence. Scalia and the majority held that the evidence should not be excluded
because the societal costs of excluding the evidence outweighed any deterrent
effect the rule would have in this particular case where the police had a valid
warrant and knocked and announced, but only waited three to five seconds. 28 It
is thus clear that the automatic exclusionary rule is becoming less automatic.
29
21. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. - (2009); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586
(2006).
22. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
23. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
24. United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (1984).
25. Id. at 920-21.
26. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591.
27. Id. at 586 (quoting Penn. Bd. of Prob. and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)).
28. See generally Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
29. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. __ (2009) (holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable
when the constitutional error was caused by a police administrative clerk who negligently failed to
remove a warrant from the defendant's computer records and where imposition of the exclusionary
rule would not serve its requisite deterrent effect); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 604 (2006)
2008]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
The bottom line is that in case after case since Mapp's emphatic command
courts are in disagreement over what is a reasonable search or seizure. If courts
and judges cannot agree, how can a police officer on the beat be expected to
apply these rules in the hectic practice of everyday police work? 30 The first step
to curing the real problem is to examine the exclusionary rules of other nations,
specifically Australia and Canada, in order to illuminate both the benefits and
shortcomings of a discretionary exclusionary rule.
III. AN INTERNATIONAL DISCRETIONARY MODEL OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. Canada
Comparing our criminal procedure rules to other countries' rules frequently
meets resistance. However, if there were ever a country that the United State
should look to it should be Canada. 31 Canada has a written constitution in the
form of the Canadian Charter containing provisions that "draw heavily upon the
American Bill of Rights." 32 The Charter also has constitutional restrictions on
police powers similar to the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Consitution: "[e]veryone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search
or seizure."3 3 In addition, the Charter contains an express provision dealing with
the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. Canada's exclusionary rule is
discretionary, however, not automatic. 34 The Canadian Charter states:
Where... a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that
infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the
evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the
("Even then, however, the Court would have to acknowledge that extending the remedy of
exclusion to all the evidence seized following a knock-and-announce violation would mean
revising the requirement of causation that limits our discretion in applying the exclusionary rule")
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
30. See Totten et al., supra note 6, at 901-03.
31. James Stribopoulos, Lessons from the Pupil: A Canadian Solution to the American
Exclusionary Rule Debate, 22 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 77, 81-82 (1999) (stating that
Canada and the United States share close geographic proximity, similar
cultures, and a common language. Both nations have ethnically diverse
populations forged from immigrant citizens who predominantly reside in
concentrated urban areas. Both nations have prospered throughout the post-war
era and share similar levels of economic development. Although differences
definitely exist, it is arguable that no two nations share so many similarities).
32. Id. at 82.
33. Constitution Act, 1982 pt. I, § 8.
34. Id. § 24(2).
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circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute. 35
The similarities of Canadian constitutional law with the United States and
the clear restrictions placed on police search and seizure procedures suggest that
"Canada has the most fully developed exclusionary law of any country studied
outside of the United States. ' 36 One very stark difference between the Canadian
rationale for their exclusionary rule and the United States' is that Canada's
adoption of the discretionary model was fueled by ensuring "the integrity of the
judiciary and the legal system, not deterrence, that lead Canada to reconsider its
position on illegally obtained evidence."3 7 Judicial integrity is the hallmark of
Canada's discretionary model and courts will consider "all the circumstances" to
determine whether sanctioning the improper police action will bring "the
administration of justice into disrepute.
During the first ten years of Canada's adoption of the discretionary
exclusionary rule, forty cases reached the Supreme Court of Canada in which
nineteen cases completely excluded the evidence.39 Canada's model is effective
and its emphasis on judicial integrity may be useful in reforming the American
exclusionary rule. However, another international comparison is necessary.
B. Australia
Australia's Constitution does not have a Fourth Amendment equivalent and
most "[r]estraints on police investigatory powers... [are] found in State statutes
and in the common law."4 0 Traditionally, Australian courts followed the English
model where judges could only exclude evidence that would ultimately result in
unfairness to the defendant's trial. 4 1 The English rule was replaced in 1978 by
the High Court in Bunning v. Cross.4 2  There, the Australian High Court
established a multi-factor test designed at weighing individual liberties with the
public interest in obtaining convictions for guilty criminals. 43  Judges have
discretion when deciding whether unlawfully obtained evidence will be
35. Id.
36. Craig M. Bradley, Mapp Goes Abroad, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 382 (2001).
37. Stribopoulos, supra note 31, at 117.
38. See id.
39. F.L. Morton et al., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Descriptive Analysis
of the First Decade, 1982-1992, 5 NAT'L .J. CONST. L. 1, 32 (1994).
40. Stribopoulos, supra note 31, at 90-91.
41. Id.
42. Bunning v. Cross (1978) 141 C.L.R. 54.
43. Id. at 77-81.
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excluded. The court "is required to balance the need to convict the guilty against
the need to condemn police misconduct." 44 Factors the court may consider are:
(1) Seriousness of the crime
(2) Deliberateness of the police misconduct
(3) Relationship between the illegality and the cogency of the evidence
(4) The ease with which evidence could have been obtained if police had
complied with the law
(5) The policy underlying the relevant regulation. 45
Because of the absence of a Fourth Amendment equivalent the "raison
d'6tre is thus to facilitate police investigation rather than to protect individuals
from undue interference." 6 The rules governing police conduct are made up of
statutory grants of powers alongside statutory restrictions. 47  Examining the
discretionary model, one scholar has recently tested the effectiveness of
Australia's exclusionary rule.
Brain Presser reviewed a series of thirty-nine cases that reached the High
Court in order to test the efficacy of Australian discretionary model. 48 After
reviewing these cases Pressor concluded that Australian courts are very reluctant
to exclude evidence after finding the police acted unlawfully.49 Specifically,
only six of the thirty-nine cases excluded evidence where an objection was made
to the introduction of the evidence based on police misconduct. Based on
these empirical findings, Pressor drew five empirically supportable conclusions:
(1) Judges had liberal attitudes to police misconduct; (2) Police were given extra
latitude in drug-related cases; (3) Appellate courts were more likely to find
police misconduct when it would not ultimately result in the exclusion of
evidence; (4) Despite police misconduct, evidence not likely to be excluded in
serious cases; (5) Evidence was more likely to be excluded when defendant was
within a protected class. 
51
These findings are not surprising when looking at the factors Australian
judges consider and when viewed in light of Australia not having a Fourth
Amendment equivalent. The balance in Australia is titled towards police
44. Marcus & Waye, supra note 20, at 41.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 38.
47. Id.
48. Brain Presser, Public Policy, Police Interest: A Re-Evaluation of the Judicial Discretion to
Exclude Improperly or Illegally Obtained Evidence, 25 MELB. U. L. REv. 757 (2001).
49. Id. at 777.
50. Id. at 776.
51. Id. at 777-82.
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investigation rather than protection of individual privacy.52 While the findings
are not surprising, these results are unacceptable in America. But there are many
aspects of the Australian system that may be useful to our system.
53
The problem in Australia is not the discretionary model. Rather, the
problem with their system, if applied to ours, is the tilt towards criminal
investigation and the factors that are weighed by the judges. Our Fourth
Amendment requires that our system be titled heavily toward the individual and
different factors to be weighed. Before incorporating the international
discretionary model into the American system, an in-depth examination of the
debates surrounding our automatic exclusionary rule will serve to highlight some
of the complaints and benefits of an automatic model.
IV. THE CURRENT DEBATE-To EXCLUDE OR NOT TO EXCLUDE, THAT IS THE
QUESTION
This section will outline the different positions held by scholars and their
divergent justifications for either keeping our current exclusionary rule intact or
reforming it with another proposal. Many of these scholars advocate that the
automatic exclusionary rule is the only mechanism that can sufficiently protect
Americans' privacy rights while others argue for its complete abrogation.
Scholars debating the exclusionary rule argue from all angles. One novel
argument supporting the current exclusionary rule is that it is constitutionally
justified and required under separation of powers principles. 54 Timothy Lynch
argues that our system of "checks and balances" requires the judiciary to keep
the executive branch in check by excluding evidence that violates the
Constitution.55 This constitutional justification stems from the judicial nature of
the Fourth Amendment's plain language: "(1) the judicial nature of the warrant-
issuing process; (2) the 'probable cause' requirement; (3) the 'Oath or
affirmation' requirement; and (4) the particularity requirement." 56  Lynch's
persuasive constitutional justification for the exclusionary rule on separation of
powers principles compels the conclusion that the exclusionary rule is
constitutionally justified. Thus, any reform that attempted to replace the
exclusionary rule with other remedies-like civilian review boards 57 or
constitutional tort litigation-would fall short of what our constitutional
52. Marcus & Waye, supra note 20, at 38.
53. See discussion infra Part IV.
54. Timothy Lynch, In Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 23 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 711, 716
(2000).
55. Id. at 717.
56. Id. at 725.
57. See Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for Civilian Review
Boards, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 551, 592-604 (1997).
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structures requires. However, if Lynch's argument wins the day, separation of
power principles would not preclude replacing the automatic exclusionary rule
with a discretionary one. Under either, the judiciary is still performing its
"check" on the executive, and the judicial branch is not admitting
constitutionally infected evidence obtained by a coordinate branch of
government.
On the other hand, Justice Blackmun stated in United States v. Leon that
"the scope of the exclusionary rule is subject to change in light of changing
judicial understanding about the effects of the rule outside the confines of the
courtroom." 58 Taken at face value, this statement implies that the exclusionary
rule truly is not commanded by the Fourth Amendment; rather it is merely "the
best remedy at hand" to protect privacy.
59
Heeding Justice Blackmun's call, Caldwell and Chase argue that the
American exclusionary rule should be reformed and that, in its current form, the
exclusionary rule (1) does not deter police misconduct; (2) generates public
hostility towards the criminal justice system; (3) places substantial financial
burdens on the criminal justice system; (4) provides an incentive to and
encourages police cover-ups and perjury; (5) decreases individuals' privacy
rights; and (6) results in inefficient prosecutions. 60
Their proposal argues that the automatic exclusionary rule should be
replaced with a tri-partite mechanism. First, after a court finds a constitutional
violation there must be some affirmative duty on the courts or the police to
educate officers of their mistakes, and according to Caldwell and Chase, there
currently is no education system in place to correct future police action.
6 1
Second, there must be a punishment imposed on police officers that violate the
Fourth Amendment, including a sliding scale where "innocent" mistakes may
only require mandatory attendance to training classes whereas intentional
violations may be punished by fines, suspensions, or community service.
62
Finally, there must be an incentive for the defendant to raise constitutional
violations, and because the exclusion of evidence would no longer be available,
the incentive would be a reduced sentence (assuming the defendant is
convicted). 63
58. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984).
59. Henry M. Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary Rule: Heeding Justice
Blaclonun's Call to Examine the Rule in Light of Changing Judicial Understanding About Its
Effects Outside the Courtroom, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 45, 66 (1994).
60. Id. at 49-56.
61. Id. at 68-69.
62. Id. at 69-70.
63. Id. at 70-72.
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Similar proposals have been mentioned by other esteemed individuals,
garnering much attention. Second Circuit Court of Appeal Judge Guido
Calabresi proposed replacing the exclusionary rule with a similarly novel
system.64 In his model, defendants could only raise questions concerning the
propriety of evidence after the trial was over. 65 If a violation is found, theS66
defendant gets a reduction on his sentencing points. The more egregious the
police conduct, the more of a reduction in sentencing guideline points.6 7 Thus,
an egregious violation paired with a relatively minor criminal defense may result
in the defendant going free, or in more serious cases, the defendant may get
several years reduced from the sentence. 68  The second part of his model
imposes direct punishment upon the violating officers (similar to Caldwell and
Chase's proposal).69 The more egregious or willful the conduct, the harsher the
punishment (which may include criminal punishment under Calabresi's
proposal).
Yale Kamisar responded to Calabresi's proposal by calling it
"disappointing" and concluding that the punishment component of Calabresi's
model, assuming the police officer's superiors would be the one making the
punishment decision, would "likely have no impact on the police at all."
70
Moreover, the defendant would be convicted on the basis of constitutionally
infected evidence even when the police conduct was willful, intentional, or
reckless. 7 1 Additionally, Kamisar notes the likelihood of adopting such an
approach seems impracticable because it may be political suicide for politicians
to advocate imposing direct punishment on police officers for violating a
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.
72
Defending the exclusionary rule, Kamisar points out that critics often
assume "that the criminal defendant who benefits from the application of the
search and seizure exclusionary rule will often be a murderer or rapist."
73
Kamisar cites a study performed by Thomas Davies concluding that the
exclusion of evidence in murder, rape, and other serious violent cases are
64. Calabresi, supra note 2, at 116-18.




69. Id. at 116-17.
70. Kamisar, supra note 9, at 135-36.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 127.
73. Id. at 131 (footnote omitted).
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"exceedingly rare." 74 Kamisar provides an effective defense of the exclusionary
rule, poking holes in many of the arguments advocating for its reform.
However, Kamisar may tell everyone else why they are wrong, but his article
fails to clearly state why he is right.
Conversely, Totten et al., have proposed a balancing test that considers the
following factors:
(1) The magnitude of the illegality,
(2) The good faith of the officers,
(3) The importance and probative value of the evidence,
(4) The degree to which the admissibility of the evidence is likely to effect the
integrity and validity of the fact finding process,
(5) The seriousness of charged offenses,
(6) The likely effect on public safety of inadmissibility,
(7) The extent to which a serious injustice would result from admissibility,
(8) Clarity of the law,
(9) The extent to which the officers should have known at the time of their
conduct that it was illegal,
(10) The extent to which the officers' conduct was an invasion of personal
privacy and the magnitude of that invasion,
(11) The extent to which good faith consideration of public safety and officer
safety influenced their decision.
75
Fundamentally, a balancing test is not very different than a discretionary
model that weighs factors. The balancing test is a good idea, but the factors set
forth by Totten and company are both deficient and redundant. A new proposal
is in order if the proper balance between privacy and government interference is
to be struck.
V. FOCUSING ON SOLUTIONS
A. Proposed Discretionary Exclusionary Rule
The privacy rights of Americans would be protected to a higher degree if
we adopted a discretionary model of the Exclusionary Rule. In our system,
74. Id. (citing Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn)
About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests,
1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611, 640, 645.
75. Totten et al., supra note 6, at 914-15.
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judges do not have discretion to exclude evidence for constitutional violations.
This is in stark contrast to both the Australian and Canadian systems that allows
judges to first determine whether the government's actions were unlawful and
then permits the court, despite the existence of unlawful police conduct, to use
its discretion in deciding whether to exclude the evidence or not.
Admittedly, there are more significant and intolerable problems with the
Australian exclusionary rule than the Canadian model. For example, one factor
Australian courts may consider is the seriousness of the crime. 76 Under my
proposal, see infra, judges would not be permitted to consider the seriousness of
the crime. Preventing judges from considering this factor would ensure that
judges were not merely excluding evidence in cases where minor crimes were
committed. By disallowing this factor, hopefully, it will cure the troubling
empirical finding that Brain Presser found in his study of Australian courts.
77
The focus should be on an objective view of police conduct. A violation of the
Constitution is identical whether it occurs in seizing marijuana or in arresting a
murderer. The only instance where the seriousness of the crime would be
relevant would be in discussing whether an exception to the warrant requirement
was present (e.g., exigent circumstances).
The Canadian model has fewer problems, but the factors our courts
consider must reflect our jurisprudence and our values. The emphasis on
ensuring judicial integrity is borrowed from the Canadian model. The Canadian
rationale is to maintain a just public perception of the judiciary. Our need to
ensure judicial integrity would be more based on separation of powers principles
than public perception.
The following proposal will cure the deficiencies of our current automatic
exclusionary rule while maintaining our emphatic demand that privacy be
protected from government invasion. It does so by adopting the overall
discretionary model of Australia and Canada by simultaneously addressing their
shortcomings and incorporating certain respective aspects in outlining the factors
for American courts to consider-factors that reflect our Constitution, our
jurisprudence, and our values.
The Exclusion Of Evidence § 1: Discretionary Exclusionary Rule.
In all instances where it is found that the government has violated the
Fourth Amendment rights of any person, a court may, in its sound
discretion, exclude the unlawfully obtained evidence. Factors the
court must consider are: (1) the place of the violation, (2) whether the
violation was in good faith, negligent, grossly negligent, reckless, or
willful considering the clarity of the law, (3) whether other means were
76. Marcus & Waye, supra note 20, at 41.
77. Presser, supra note 48.
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available to gather the evidence without violating the Constitution, (4)
whether exclusion would serve to deter future constitutional violations
and (5) whether refusing to exclude evidence would call into doubt
judicial integrity. The court must not consider such factors such as (1)
the seriousness of the underlying criminal offense, (2) the degree of
necessity of the evidence to the government's case, or (3) the
availability of remedies other than the exclusion of evidence to the
defendant.
Comments
(a) Burden of Proof, A Heavy Presumption. After a constitutional
violation is first found, the government has the heavy burden in
persuading the court to exercise its discretion to exclude the evidence.
The exclusionary rule is heavily presumed to be proper in the case of
any Fourth Amendment violation. If the court determines the
exclusionary rule is improper in a given case, it must set forth its
reasoning as to each factor considered, the weight given to each factor,
and the legal justification for its conclusion.
(b) Standard of Review. All decisions of the trial court excluding
evidence are to be reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion
standard of review. All decisions of the trial court refusing to exclude
evidence are to be reviewed de novo.
(c) Purpose. The purpose of the discretionary exclusionary rule is
threefold: (1) to protect the privacy of individual citizens, (2) to
present a "check" upon the executive branch in executing their police
powers, and (3) to deter unconstitutional acts committed by the
government. In applying the discretionary exclusionary rule, courts
should keep in mind that the Fourth Amendment commands that
individual liberty be placed above the need to facilitate criminal
investigation or to procure convictions.78 Courts no longer are
required to exclude evidence in Fourth Amendment violation
instances, but rather may exercise their discretion in deciding whether
to exclude evidence taking into consideration the factors outlined in
the statute, the burden of proof, and the heavy presumptions found in
section (a). The intent of this rule is not to reduce the current levels of
excluded evidence. The ultimate aim is for the court to decide the
Fourth Amendment violation issue free of a mandatory exclusionary
rule in order to revamp current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence into
clear standards. These clear standards are necessary for the
78. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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government to know precisely when they are acting within the
parameters of the Fourth Amendment.
(d) Factors.
(1) The place of the violation. The first factor to weigh in
considering whether evidence should be excluded after finding a
violation of the Fourth Amendment is where the violation
occurred. If the constitutional violation involved a residence,
there is a strong presumption that exclusion is proper.79 The
presumption would be weaker if the violation involved a vehicle
or an open field.
(2) Whether the violation was in good faith, negligent, grossly
negligent, reckless, or willful considering the clarity of the law.
This factor requires addressing whether the police officer knew or
should have known that their actions were unconstitutional. If a
police department has failed to adequately train 8° their officers or
otherwise failed to adequately inform them of new developments
in Fourth Amendment law, a heavy presumption of exclusion will
rise. Police departments should be presumed to be as informed as
a court on the state of Fourth Amendment law. Assuming
officers are trained adequately, the level of scienter of the
violating police officer should be a factor in determining whether
exclusion is proper. This factor is also inextricably linked to
whether excluding the evidence would deter the government's
action.
(3) Whether other means were available to gather the evidence
without violating the Constitution. If the police could have used
other legal means to procure the unconstitutionally obtained
79. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[lit is beyond
dispute that the home is entitled to special protection as the center of the private lives of our
people"); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 604 (1999) (adhering to the "centuries-old principles of
respect for the privacy of the home .. "); see also JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE
ix (2d ed. 1991).
The raw power held by a police officer conducting a search is enormous. An
officer wielding a search warrant has the authority of the law to forcibly enter
one's home and search for evidence. The officer can enter at night and wake
you from your sleep, roust you from bed, rummage in your drawers and papers,
and upend your entire home. Even though the particularity clause of the
warrant defines the scope of the search, the search, as a practical matter, will be
as intense as the officer chooses to make it.
Id.
80. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
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evidence, there is a rebuttable presumption that the evidence
should be excluded. This factor has been borrowed from both
Australia 8' and Canada's model. This is only a rebuttable
presumption rather than a strong presumption because most of the
time the police could have used alternative legal means to procure
the evidence. If the evidence could not have been obtained but
for the illegal action the government will likely not be able to
rebut the presumption.
(4) Whether exclusion would serve to deter future constitutional
violations. This factor is drawn directly from the American
exclusionary rule and is intended to import the analysis already
used by American courts. Specifically, courts weigh the deterrent
benefits of excluding the evidence versus the societal costs of not
excluding the evidence.
82
(5) Whether refusing to exclude evidence would call into doubt
judicial integrity. This factor is the hallmark of the Canadian
system and was initially one of the justifications for the American
rule. Judicial integrity must resurface8 3 as a factor to consider in
this proposed rule. 84 Using Canada's standard, if admitting the
evidence would bring "the administration of justice into
disrepute" a court should exclude the evidence. Moreover, courts
must keep in mind that they are the "check" upon the executive in
our system resting upon separation of powers.85
81. Marcus & Waye, supra note 20, at 41 (citing factor four: "ease with which evidence could
have been obtained if police had complied with the law").
82. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 587 (2006).
83. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (speaking of the "imperative of judicial
integrity" in the exclusionary rule context).
84. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it
fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it
invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the
end justifies the means-to declare that the government may commit crimes in
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible
retribution. Against this pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its
face.
Id.
85. See Lynch, supra note 54.
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These five factors, borrowing the discretionary model from both Australia
and Canada would be a constitutionally permissible and more effective
replacement to our current exclusionary rule. As is obvious, the factors, burdens
of proof, presumptions, and circumstances that are not permitted to be
considered are all strongly weighted toward protecting individual privacy.
B. Factors the Court May Not Consider
The court may not consider factors such as (1) the seriousness of the
underlying criminal offense, (2) the degree of necessity of the evidence to the
government's case, or (3) the availability of remedies other than the exclusion of
evidence to the defendant. First, the seriousness of the crime underlying the
criminal offense may not be taken into consideration because, if it were, a court
would have an incentive to not exclude evidence even in the case of an egregious
constitutional violation. Australian courts weigh this factor and it has
contributed to unacceptable results.86 This is a prime example of how Australian
factors are unacceptable to American jurisprudence. But Australia's overall
discretionary model can still be borrowed.
Second, courts may not consider the necessity of the evidence to the
government's case. Whether the evidence constitutes a part of or all of the
government's case is simply irrelevant to whether evidence should be excluded.
To allow this factor to be weighed police would have an incentive to violate an
individual's privacy rights in situations where obtaining the incriminating
evidence could not be effectuated by lawful means.87
Third, judges should not be allowed to consider the availability of other
remedies to the defendant. Of course, disallowing this factor is in contradiction
to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hudson v. Michigan.88  After
considering the factor outlined above, if the court finds the government has met
their burdens and overcome the heavy presumptions weighted against them, then
the court may use its discretion to exclude the evidence. Giving courts a mental
safety net ("the defendant can always file a lawsuit") detracts from the
dispositive issue: has the evidence been unconstitutionally infected to the extent
that refusal to exclude it is inconsistent with the purposes of the rule?
86. See Presser, supra note 48, at 780.
87. One of the factors courts must consider under my proposal is "whether other means were
available to gather the evidence without violating the Constitution." Presumably this factor would
protect against the government arguing the unlawfully obtained evidence is necessary to their case
if the evidence could not have been obtained "but for" the unlawful act. However, not allowing
courts to even consider this argument is likely a more effective method for preventing courts from
entertaining such arguments.
88. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006).
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The factors judges may consider, and those that they may not, represent our
values and jurisprudence and ultimately will cure the real problem with our
jurisprudence.
VI. CURING THE REAL PROBLEM.
Reforming exclusionary jurisprudence in this manner provides a solution to
the real problem. The real problem is not the harshness or reflexive application
of the exclusionary rule. The real problem is that our current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is a morass of confusing, complex, and subtle legal
niceties nearly impossible to master by lawyers, let alone police officers. 89 For
example, the California Peace Officers Legal Sourcebook has more than two
hundred pages addressing fifty different topics. Police officers are not the only
ones confused. Legal academia, judges, and lawyers "cannot predict with
accuracy the application of exclusionary rules in a particular hearing."
91
One of the best examples of how confusing and unclear Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has become is an experiment conducted by New York Supreme
Court Judge Harold Rothwax. Judge Rothwax distributed two fact patterns of
then recently reported Supreme Court opinions to a set of appellate justices.92
He then asked the appellate justices to decide the suppression issue.93 More than
half the appellate justices decided the case differently than a majority of the
Supreme Court.
94
One commentator has put it nicely: "Fourth Amendment case law is a
sinking ocean liner-rudderless and badly off course-yet most scholarship
contents itself with rearranging the deck chairs." 95 The complex morass of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 96 has resulted from judges avoiding the harsh
consequences of the automatic exclusionary rule. 97 Avoidance of the harsh
remedy has turned otherwise unreasonable searches into constitutionally
89. Totten et al., supra note 6, at 900-03.
90. Joel Carey, California Dep't of Justice, California Peace Officer's Legal Sourcebook
(1998).
91. MACKLIN FLEMING, OF CRIMES AND RIGHTS: THE PENAL CODE VIEWED AS A BILL OF RIGHTS
156 (Norton & Co. 1978).
92. HAROLD J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 58 (Random House
1996).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 58-59.
95. Akhil Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 759 (1994).
96. See id. at 800-03.
97. See Calabresi, supra note 2, at 111-12.
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protected police action because "courts keep expanding what is deemed a
reasonable search or seizure."
98
In our system judges frequently stretch, contort, and expand the definition
of what constitutes a reasonable search.9 9 Presumably, judges do not want blood
on their hands if they release a dangerous criminal back into society only to kill,
rape, or rob again. Moreover, though judges have taken the oath (external oath),
to serve the law rather than their own sense of justice or morals (internal oath), it
is unclear whether these two oaths are in reality severable. The end result is an
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's "reasonable search and seizure"
requirement that permits many searches and seizures that should be considered
unreasonable.
For some, a discretionary model may be too radical a departure from an
automatic model. However, in a sense, the manner in which judges "choose" to
interpret the word "reasonable" is no different than allowing them "discretion" in
applying a rule of exclusion. In the Fourth Amendment context, if judges are
required to consider the totality of the circumstances and they may place certain
weight on some facts and diminish the value of other facts, how is this different
from requiring judges to consider certain factors and permitting them to use their
discretion in deciding whether to apply a legal rule? Certainly, when weighing
the factors judges will "choose" what weight to give each respective factor just
like a judge may give certain weight to particular facts in determining what is
reasonable. Likewise, in differing situations different facts may weigh more
heavily than others. Similarly, in different situations, in a discretionary-weigh-
the-factors-model judges may assign different weight to different factors. 100
While this analysis is based on logic, experience drives the need for reform.
Our experience tells us that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence must be reformed.




A discretionary-weigh-the-factors-model would result in courts finding
more constitutional violations when relieved of the pressures of a harsh
automatic exclusionary rule. By allowing courts to more freely find
98. Id. at 112.
99. Id.
100. Assume the results of a discretionary model exclude the same amount of evidence as the
automatic rule. If this is true, then some may say, "Why change?" The reason why the change
should occur is that by making the rule discretionary, judges can find more constitutional
violations and clean up the mess of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
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constitutional violations the law will become more certain, ultimately informing
police more clearly on what they may and may not do.
